Time and Mind: The Cognitive Science of Temporal Representation
Abstract
Time is in many ways a rather odd feature of our environment. Time isn't something that we can readily point to, it's not something that we can clearly manipulate, and it's arguably something that we can't enter into causal contact with. And yet, all animals need to coordinate their behaviors with the temporal structure of the world around them. How we explain this temporal coordination - what I call the temporal coordination problem - is the focus of my dissertation.
Although philosophers have always had an interest in how the mind represents time, contemporary philosophers have largely neglected a wealth of relevant scientific research in neuroscience, computational psychology, zoology and related fields. My dissertation is meant to remedy this neglect by using the temporal coordination problem as a means to address a number of outstanding philosophical and methodological questions that arise in the philosophical and scientific study of temporal representation, and mental representation and cognitive architecture more generally.
In chapter 1, I introduce the temporal coordination problem and lay out the philosophical background on naturalistic theories of mental representation that serves as a backdrop for the thesis as a whole. Importantly, in this introductory chapter I argue that there will be no single solution to the temporal coordination problem since any given animal employs a number of different strategies for coordinating their behavior with the temporal structure of the world around them.
In chapter 2, I use an articulation of the implicit / explicit representation distinction to provide a taxonomy of different theoretical approaches to explaining how animal behavior comes to be sensitive to the temporal structure of events in the environment.
In chapter 3, I argue that many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sense of time that is analogous to the paradigmatic senses like vision and olfaction. However, this sense of time, centered on the circadian systems, only provides animals with information about the approximate time of day. Importantly, while the sense of time is in many ways similar to the other senses, the sense of time is unique in that its information gathering capacities are not grounded in causal interactions with the external world but through its own endogenous rhythms.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on what is more commonly referred to as 'temporal perception' and 'temporal experience'. In chapter 4, I argue, on the basis of philosophical and empirical grounds, for what I call the fragmentary model of temporal perception. 'Temporal perception' and 'temporal experience' do not pick out a single unified phenomenon. Instead, they pick out an assortment of different capacities to represent the temporal structure of the world at various timescales and through various modalities. Importantly, these capacities are underpinned by often radically different timekeeping mechanisms. In this way, temporal perception is importantly fragmented. In chapter 4, I argue that this model of temporal perception undermines the long standing philosophical debate over whether the temporal contents of experience mirror the temporal structure of experience itself. There simply is no single story to be told about the temporal contents of experience relate to the temporal structure of experience itself. Some mechanisms will exploit a mirroring between content and structure, while others do not.
While chapter 4 emphasized the fragmentary nature of temporal perception, chapter 5 focuses on the unity of time as it is presented to us in perception and cognition. Regardless of through which sensory system we come to perceive some event or at which timescale these events occur, we come to perceive and think of the world as consisting of a single seamless temporal ordering within which events occur. But, given the fragmentary model of temporal perception, the information about the temporal structure of events around us are encoded by a number of distinct types of timekeeping mechanisms throughout the brain. Somehow this temporal information needs to be integrated. By drawing on parallels between the integration problem the brain faces and the development of our cultural timekeeping practices and the standardized system of units those practices rely on, I argue that the brain overcomes its integration problem by unitizing time. Interestingly, this chapter serves as a case study in which literature from the history and philosophy of science comes to shape our understanding of the brain.
Chapter 6 serves as a brief conclusion that draws out the conclusions from the preceding chapters.
Although philosophers have always had an interest in how the mind represents time, contemporary philosophers have largely neglected a wealth of relevant scientific research in neuroscience, computational psychology, zoology and related fields. My dissertation is meant to remedy this neglect by using the temporal coordination problem as a means to address a number of outstanding philosophical and methodological questions that arise in the philosophical and scientific study of temporal representation, and mental representation and cognitive architecture more generally.
In chapter 1, I introduce the temporal coordination problem and lay out the philosophical background on naturalistic theories of mental representation that serves as a backdrop for the thesis as a whole. Importantly, in this introductory chapter I argue that there will be no single solution to the temporal coordination problem since any given animal employs a number of different strategies for coordinating their behavior with the temporal structure of the world around them.
In chapter 2, I use an articulation of the implicit / explicit representation distinction to provide a taxonomy of different theoretical approaches to explaining how animal behavior comes to be sensitive to the temporal structure of events in the environment.
In chapter 3, I argue that many animals, including all mammals, possess a genuine sense of time that is analogous to the paradigmatic senses like vision and olfaction. However, this sense of time, centered on the circadian systems, only provides animals with information about the approximate time of day. Importantly, while the sense of time is in many ways similar to the other senses, the sense of time is unique in that its information gathering capacities are not grounded in causal interactions with the external world but through its own endogenous rhythms.
Chapters 4 and 5 focus on what is more commonly referred to as 'temporal perception' and 'temporal experience'. In chapter 4, I argue, on the basis of philosophical and empirical grounds, for what I call the fragmentary model of temporal perception. 'Temporal perception' and 'temporal experience' do not pick out a single unified phenomenon. Instead, they pick out an assortment of different capacities to represent the temporal structure of the world at various timescales and through various modalities. Importantly, these capacities are underpinned by often radically different timekeeping mechanisms. In this way, temporal perception is importantly fragmented. In chapter 4, I argue that this model of temporal perception undermines the long standing philosophical debate over whether the temporal contents of experience mirror the temporal structure of experience itself. There simply is no single story to be told about the temporal contents of experience relate to the temporal structure of experience itself. Some mechanisms will exploit a mirroring between content and structure, while others do not.
While chapter 4 emphasized the fragmentary nature of temporal perception, chapter 5 focuses on the unity of time as it is presented to us in perception and cognition. Regardless of through which sensory system we come to perceive some event or at which timescale these events occur, we come to perceive and think of the world as consisting of a single seamless temporal ordering within which events occur. But, given the fragmentary model of temporal perception, the information about the temporal structure of events around us are encoded by a number of distinct types of timekeeping mechanisms throughout the brain. Somehow this temporal information needs to be integrated. By drawing on parallels between the integration problem the brain faces and the development of our cultural timekeeping practices and the standardized system of units those practices rely on, I argue that the brain overcomes its integration problem by unitizing time. Interestingly, this chapter serves as a case study in which literature from the history and philosophy of science comes to shape our understanding of the brain.
Chapter 6 serves as a brief conclusion that draws out the conclusions from the preceding chapters.
